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Toward Equal Rights for Handicajped Individuals:
Judicial Enforcement of Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Among the last of the minorities to be recognized as subject to
discrimination and guaranteed equal opportunities are the men-
tally and physically disabled. Throughout the United States, qualified
persons are being denied federally funded programs and services solely
on the basis of a mental or physical handicap.' Congress responded
to this injustice by enacting section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, designed to ban discrimination on the basis of handicap.
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States,
as defined in section 706(6) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance.2
Originally intended as an amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
section 504 was appended to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as that
bill moved through the 92d and 93d Congresses. Its terms purport
to guarantee to handicapped individuals the same rights afforded other
minority or disadvantaged peoples under similar antidiscrimination
provisions.3 But because section 504 was not enacted as a. part of
those provisions, a separate program was necessary for its enforce-
ment.
This noble declaration of civil rights for the handicapped re-
mained for three years a right without a remedy because of woefully
inadequate enforcement by the executive and the judiciary. The De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), responsible for
the promulgation of implementing regulations under section 504, hesi-
tated for over three years before issuing administrative guidelines.
Final regulations were issued in April 1977,4 only after an executive
order from President Fords and a suit filed against the responsible
officials6 prodded the Department to act.
In the interim, private individuals injured by apparent violations
1. 118 CONG. REc. 525-26 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1975). The Rehabilitation Act comprises 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794.
3. See § 901 of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. 11 1972)
(relating to gender); § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970) (relating
to race, color, and national origin).
4. 45 C.F.R. § 84 (1977). These regulations became effective June 3, 1977.
5. Exec. Order No. 11,914, 3 C.F.R. 117 (1977).
6. Cherry v. Mathews, 419 F. Supp. 922 (D.D.C. 1976).
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of the provision attempted to secure performance of its promise
through the federal judiciary. The threshold question presented in
suits brought under section 504 was whether that section creates a
private cause of action or whether relief could be had only through ad-
ministrative channels. Federal district courts confronted with this
question avoided deciding it out of uncertainty whether section 504
confers a private right to sue.
There are two conceivable reasons for the district courts' uncer-
tainty. First, the courts appeared to be unfamiliar with the common-
law doctrine of implication, the traditional method for determining
whether a right to sue is implicit in a regulatory statute. Second,
even if familiar with the doctrine, the lower federal courts may have
been discouraged from applying it by recent Supreme Court decisions
disallowing implied causes of action and making the standards of the
implication doctrine more stringent. However, the Supreme Court's
recent determination to limit the implication of private causes of
action from regulatory statutes has not been absolute. The Court has
indicated that the doctrine of implication may be used to find an im-
plied cause of action to vindicate civil rights. And in the 1975 case
of Cort v. Ash,7 although the Court further restricted the use of implied
causes of actions, it indicated that the doctrine is still viable by clarify-
ing the implication methodology. A proper analysis of section 504
using the implication doctrine as restated in Cort discloses that a
private cause of action may be implied under that statute.
The first decision to face the issue squarely and discuss it fully
was Lloyd v. Regional Transportation Authority.8 In that opinion the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit applied the
Cort analysis of the implication doctrine and held that a private cause
of action did flow from section 504. Yet the cautiously exploratory
nature of the court's reasoning, which was confined to the narrow facts
presented in Lloyd, and the failure of the court to apply the doctrine
of implication properly, necessitate a clarification of the doctrine and
its application to section 504.
After an overview of district court case law involving section 504,
this article will trace the development of the doctrine of implication,
examine what appears to be a misapplication of the doctrine by the
Seventh Circuit in Lloyd, and suggest an alternative application of the
doctrine to section 504 in keeping with its historical understanding
and recent evolution.
I. THE PROBLEM OF JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT
OF SECTION 504
The question whether there is an implied cause of action under
7. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
8. 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977).
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section 504 was raised in several suits brought before HEW promul-
gated its regulations. Most of the courts avoided an analysis of the
issue, deciding the cases with scant discussion of the grounds or rea-
soning underlying their holdings. Only one district court examined
the issue and determined on the basis of express reasoning that a
cause of action was stated under section 504 by a plaintiff denied
hospital employment solely by reason of her epilepsy.9 Another dis-
trict court found that the exclusion of a mentally handicapped indi-
vidual from participation in a vocational rehabilitation program by the
state's Department of Corrections, solely on the basis of his handicap,
was forbidden by section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The court
held that section 504 "provides a cause of action for any discrimina-
tion on the basis of such handicap."' Nevertheless, no reasoning
was offered to support this holding."
In Hairston v. Drosick, 2 another district court found that the
exclusion of a minimally handicapped child from a regular public
classroom without a bona fide educational reason was in violation of
section 504. The court in Hairston, however, did not discuss the issue
of a private cause of action under section 504 and used the alterna-
tive ground of the fourteenth amendment in addition to section 504 to
justify its order that the child be readmitted to regular classes. Simi-
larly, in Gurmankin v. Costanzo 3 in which plaintiff's claim was based
on both the Rehabilitation Act and provisions of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871,14 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held for the plaintiff, but relied on due process grounds
for its decision. The court stated that section 504 was not dispositive
and lamented the absence of guidance in interpreting that provision:
"[W]hile I have been unable to find any reported decisions constru-
ing [section 504], it seems reasonably clear that a refusal to hire a blind
9. Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809. 815 (E.D. Pa. 1977). District
Judge Higginbotham came closest to following the method suggested below for determining
whether a cause of action existed under § 504 through application of the Cort doctrine of implica-
tion. See Section V. infra. Yet even this analysis %vas confined to two paragraphs of the
eight-page opinion.
In a recent case, a district court noted a "probable" right under § 504 and issued a prelimi-
nary injunction requiring a private college to furnish a deaf graduate student with an in-class
interpreter in order that she could complete coursework necessary to maintain her teaching
permit in deaf education. Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1977).
10. Sites v. McKenzie, 423 F. Supp. 1190, 1197 (N.D.W. Va. 1976).
11. The court did cite to three cases that had presented similar issues: Lau v. Nichols.
414 U.S. 563 (1974); Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 411 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976) afit 556
F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977); and Bartels v. Biernat, 405 F. Supp. 1012 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
12. 423 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. W. Va. 1976).
13. 411 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976). aff'd 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977). The circuit court
found it unnecessary to decide the § 504 issue.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
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person as a teacher is the kind of discrimination which that section was
meant to prohibit."1 5
Three courts in addition to the lower court in Ll-oyd 6 declined to
recognize a cause of action under section 504 in cases instituted by
handicapped persons against local mass transportation authorities in
attempts to render public transportation accessible to persons con-
fined to wheelchairs. In United Handicapped Federation v. Andre, 7
and in Snowden v. Birmingham-Jefferson County Transit Authority,18
the courts held that section 504 was a statement of federal policy
only and created no new right to sue. In the third case, Bartels v.
Biernat,'9 a preliminary injunction was issued to prevent the execu-
tion of contracts for the purchase of new mass transit vehicles un-
equipped for handicapped passengers. The plaintiffs were permitted
to proceed with a class action, but the court expressly refused to
"determine whether a private right of action is created by § 504. ''20
In its reversal of the district court decision in Andre, the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit relied on Lloyd, disposing of the issue
of plaintiffs' right to sue in one sentence: "We also agree that plaintiffs
do have standing to bring a private cause of action."21 Finally, in
Coleman v. Darden,22 the Colorado district court dismissed an action
to compel employment by a blind person in part because it found that
no private cause of action was created by section 504.23
This conflicting and superficial treatment demonstrates the un-
certain status of section 504 in the courts. Even those courts grant-
ing the relief sought have not disclosed the reasons behind their hold-
ings. This is not surprising, since there is little to guide courts in
construing section 504. The text of the section itself is silent concern-
ing whether section 504 confers a private right to sue for its enforce-
ment; it merely proscribes discrimination on the basis of handicap.
Nor do the regulations of the Secretary of the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare 24 address the problem of a private remedy.
The Secretary's analysis accompanying the final regulations correctly
recognizes that to confer a right to sue under section 504 is beyond
the authority of the executive branch of government.25 And despite a
15. 411 F. Supp. at 989.
16. Lloyd v. Illinois Regional Transp. Auth., No. 75-C1834 (N.D. Ill., Mar. 16, 1976),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F2d 1277 (7th Cir, 1977).
17. 409 F. Supp. 1297 (D. Minn. 1976), vacated 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977).
18. 407 F. Supp. 394 (N.D. Ala. 1975), affd, 551 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1977).
19. 405 F. Supp. 1012 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
20. Id. at 1015.
21. United Handicapped Fed. v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413, 415 (8th Cir. 1977).
22. [1977] LAB. REL. REP. (15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 272 (D, Colo.).
23. Id. at 273.
24. 45 C.F.R. § 84 (1977).
25. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,676, 22,687 (1977).
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plethora of congressional comment on the Rehabilitation Act as a
whole,26 the legislative history regarding section 504 is so meager
that one commentator has concluded that there is none.
II. THE DQCTRINE OF IMPLICATION
A. Early Development of the Doctrine
In order to determine whether a statute not expressly establish-
ing a private right of action nevertheless implicitly provides for one,
courts. have traditionally employed the doctrine of implication. This
doctrine provides that a court, confronted with a statute that is ambigu-
ous or silent concerning whether it serves as the basis for private
suit, may turn to outside sources to ascertain whether a private rem-
edy was implied in the statute by its drafters. This normally entails
application of the rules of statutory construction, analysis of the legis-
lative history, and examination of the interpretation and application
28
of the statute after its passage.
The doctrine of implication has roots in English common law as
early as 1703.29 Its rationale rests on the well-established principle
of ubi jus ibi remedium,30 or as stated by Blackstone: "[I]t is a general
and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a
legal remedy, by suit or action at law whenever that right is in-
vaded. 31  The first full exposition of the doctrine of implication ap-
pears in the 1854 case of Couch v. Steel,32 in which damages were
awarded a seaman whose illness was aggravated by defendant's fail-
ure to comply with a statutory duty to keep medicines on board his
ship. The rule stated by Lord Campbell in Couch v. Steel and by
later cases33 had been articulated by Justice Holt: "So, in every case,
where a statute enacts, or prohibits a thing for the benefit of a person,
he shall have a remedy upon the same statute for the thing enacted
for his advantage, or for the recompense of a wrong done to him con-
trary to the said law."34 The application of this rule was expanded to
include statutory negligence-the deriving of a civil action in tort from
26. See S. REP. No. 391, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R. REP. No. 500, 93d Cong.. 2d Sess.;
S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. REP. No. 244, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.; all reprinted in
[19731 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2076.
27. Comment, Equal Employment and the Disabled: A Proposal, 10 COLUNI. J. L & Soc.
PROB. 457, 466 (1974).
28. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
29. Anonymous, 87 Eng. Rep. 791 (Q.B. 1703); Rowning v. Goodchild. 96 Eng. Rep.
536 (C.P. 1776).
30. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 40-41 (1916).
31. 3 W. BLACKS'TONE, COMMENTARIES *23.
32. 118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (Q.B. 1854).
33. .Eg., Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33. 39 (1916).
34. J. COMYNS, DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, § F Action Upon Staute *442 (quot-
ing Holt, C.J., Anon., 6 Mod. 26, 27).
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a criminal statute M-and from there was extended to include infer-
ences36 of implied causes of action from regulatory statutes.
Since Couch v. Steel, the process of determining whether a pri-
vate cause of action should be implied under a :;tatute has entailed
two basic inquiries: first, whether the particular plaintiff facing the
court is the proper beneficiary of the right conferred by the legislation,
and second, whether the language and purpose of the statute and the
scheme of enforcement warrant an implied remedy.37
The seminal federal case enunciating the doctrine of implication
was Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Rigsby.38 In that case, a railroad
employee was injured while riding a box car with defective hand-
holds. His suit against the railroad was based on the Federal Safety
Appliance Acts,39 one section of which established a duty of railroads
to equip all cars with secure handholds. The Supreme Court, using
the implication doctrine, permitted the action. Recognizing that there
was "no express language conferring a right of action for the death or
injury of an employee," the Court nevertheless concluded that both re-
quirements for the application of the implication doctrine were satis-
factorily fulfilled because "the safety of employees and travelers is
[the Acts'] principal object, and the right of private action by an injured
employee . . . has never been doubted. 4°
After the Rigsby decision, the implication doctrine was utilized
with increasing frequency, particularly by the Warren Court, to further
the implementation of many regulatory statutes. Although the most
frequent focus of implied actions has been the federal securities laws,4"
private actions have been implied under such other provisions as the
antitrust laws,42 the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 43 the Railway La-
35. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 190 (4th ed. 1971); Thayer.
Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARe. L. REv. 317 (1914); RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OP
TORTS §§ 285-86 (1965).
36. While the doctrine might be more appropriately labeled a process of "inference"
from the text and history of a statute, the designation "implication" reveals the doctrine's
rationale: a court is considered to be carrying out its recognized obligation to interpret tile
legislative mandate by finding a cause of action that was implied by the legislature in a statute.
37. See, e.g., Guernsey v. Rich Plan, 408 F. Supp. 582, 586 (1976)
38. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
39. The Safety Appliance Act of 1893, ch. 196, § 4, 27 Stat. 531, as amended t' Act
of April 14, 1910, ch. 160, § 2, 36 Stat. 298.
40. 241 U.S. at 39.
41. Eg., 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1970). See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S,
128 (1972); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Deckert v. Independence Shares
Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940); Note, Implication of Private Actions fror Federal Statutes: From
Borak to Ash, I J. CORP. L. 371 (1976). Sde generally I A. BROMIBERO, SECURITIES LAW:
FRAUD §§ 2.4(l)-(2) (1975).
42. Eg., 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970). See, e.g., Crumplar, An Alternative to Public and Victim
Enforcement of the Federal Securities and Antitrust Laws: Citizen Enforcement, 13 HARV, J.
LEGIS. 76 (1975).
43. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1970). See Cole & Shapiro, Private ritgation Under the Fed-
eral Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act: Should the Right to Sue Be Implied?, 30 FOOD DREUO COSM.
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bor Act,44 the Air Commerce Act,45 and the Consumer Credit Protec-
tion Act.
46
B. Restriction of the Doctrine
The expansive use of the doctrine during the Warren Court years
triggered apprehension about its propriety, leading to restriction of its
use by the Burger Court. Criticism has focused on two perceived
faults of implication: first, that it constitutes improper judicial legis-
lation; and second, that it encourages litigation, thus aggravating the
already excessive burden borne by the federal judiciary.
These criticisms were expressed by the dissenting Justices in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents,47 which implied an
action for damages against unlawful conduct by federal agents.
Bivens presented a particularly apt forum for criticism of the implica-
tion doctrine since it involved an extreme form of implication: the
Court inferred a cause of action, not from a statute, but directly from
the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, and the re-
sulting class of potential plaintiffs who could avail themselves of the
cause of action encompassed every person in the United States. In his
dissent, Chief Justice Burger expressed his dissatisfaction with the
doctrine as follows: "I dissent from today's holding which judicially
creates a damage remedy not provided for by the Constitution and not
enacted by Congress . . . . Legislation is the business of the Con-
gress, and it has the facilities and competence for that task-as we do
not."48 He was joined in this view by Justice Black: "N]either Con-
gress nor the State of New York has enacted legislation creating such
a right of action. For us to do so is, in my judgment, an exercise of
power that the Constitution does not give us., 49 In a separate dissent,
Justice Blackmun also complained of the "judicial legislation," which
he felt "opens the door for another avalanche of new federal
cases."
50
L.J. 576 (1975). Congress amended this Act in 1972 to grant the courts express jurisdiction
over violations. 21 U.S.C. §§ 331-32 (Supp. V 1975).
44. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1970). See, e.g., Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen &
Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Burke v. Compania Mexicana De Avacion. 433 F.2d 1031 (9th
Cir. 1970).
45. 49 U.S.C. §§ 173, 181 (1970). See, e.g., Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co..
35 F.2d 761, 763 (N.D. Ohio 1929).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1970). See, e.g., Stewart v. Travelers Corp., 503 F.2d 108 (9th
Cir. 1974); Western v. Hodgson, 359 F. Supp. 194 (S.D. W. Va. 1973), afld 494 F.2d 379 (4th
Cir. 1974); Simpson v. Sperry Rand Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1057 (W.D. La. IQ72). vacated on
other grounds, 488 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1973). See also Note, Implying a Civih Remedy from 15
U.S.C. § 1674(a), 54 NEB. L. REv. 744 (1975).
47. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
48. Id. at 411-12 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 428 (Black, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Dissatisfaction with the doctrine of the sort expressed in the
Bivens dissents prevailed in later majority holdings.51 In National
Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Pas-
sengers (Amtrak),52 a private cause of action was sought by train
passengers under the Amtrak Act53 to enjoin an announced discon-
tinuance of certain routes. And in Securities Investor Protection Corp.
v. Barbour (SIPC),54 broker customers attempted to compel the SIPC
to provide financial relief to failing brokerages under the Securities
Investor Protection Act.5 5  Four justices who had permitted an implied
cause of action in Bivens joined Justices Blackmun and Burger 6 in
opinions that evidenced a decided shift away from the liberal applica-
tion of the doctrine that had developed during the Warren Court years.
In both cases the Court applied the doctrine of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius57 to find that administrative remedies provided in the
Amtrak Act and the Securities Investor Protection Act precluded
implied private actions under the statutes.
5 8
Amtrak and SIPC concerned statutes regulating economic
interests. The criticisms encouraging an anti-implication stance in
areas of economic regulation do not necessarily apply to regulatory
schemes created to protect civil rights. The argument that the impli-
cation of a private remedy from an antidiscrimination statute, such as
section 504, constitutes judicial legislation is outweighed by the need
and value of a private remedy to vindicate civil rights. Hence, where-
as in some situations implication may constitute judicial legislation,
in other cases it may more properly be viewed as the realization of the
51. See generally' McMahon & Rodos, Judicial Implication of Private Causes of Action:
Reappraisal and Retrenchment, 80 DICK L. REv. 167 (1976).
52. 414 U.S. 453 (1974). For a perceptive discussion by a circuit judge of Amtrak as a
"signal . . . to decelerate use of . . . implied civil remedies" see Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416,
426-27 (3d Cir. 1974) (Aldisert, J., dissenting), revId, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
53. The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, 45 U.S.C. §§ 501-644 (1970).
54. 421 U.S. 412 (1975).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78hh-I (1970).
56. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stewart and White, who together with Justice Douglas
had composed the majority in Bivens, shifted to support the denial o private actions in Amtrak
and SIPC. Justice Douglas thus emerged as the only dissenter in e ther of the two later opin-
ions.
57. In defining this maxim as follows: "the specific mention of one . . . thing implies
the exclusion of other . . . things," Justice Francis McCaffrey warned that it "must be applied
with great caution." F. MCCAFFREY, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 17 (1953). The Supreme
Court had earlier stated that the maxim should be "subordinated to the doctrine that courts
will construe the details of an act in conformity with its dominating general purpose ... "
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943). Although the Court pro.
ceeded cautiously in both Amtrak and SIPC, recognizing that the maxim "must yield to it clear
contrary evidence of legislative intent," the revival of its use for implication purposes is indi-
cative of the stricter approach toward implied private remedies undertaken in those cases,
The usefulness of the expressio maxim in this context is totally rejected in HART & SACKS,
THE LEGAL PROCESS 1173-74 (temp. ed. 1958).
58. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 419, 425 (1975); Na-
tional R.R. Passengers Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453. 458, 461
(1974).
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judicial duty to enforce the expressed purpose of the statute. Con-
gress is a general policy-determining body, which is not always institu-
tionally capable of enacting exhaustive remedial provisions. A fail-
ure to include specific remedies may be read as a congressional
delegation of responsibility to the federal courts to fashion remedies
that will effectuate the articulated purposes of Congress. This institu-
tional justification was explained by one commentator as follows:
The weaknesses of the court as lawmaker-the lack of debates and hear-
ings, the retroactive effect of its solution, the uncertainty of its public
mandate-are less serious when conduct has already been proscribed by
the legislature and only an additional remedy is sought. Making its own
decision in relation to an existing and functioning statute, the court may
be in an even better position to assess the need for supplemental civil
relief than was the legislature at the time of enactment.59
Section 504 is exactly the type of statute that would be more
effectively enforced by a private remedy. Because the term "handi-
cap" encompasses a wide range of disabilities, from physical disorders
such as blindness and paralysis to mental disorders such as mental
illness and retardation, 6" discrimination on the basis of handicap takes
innumerable forms. Congress could not be expected to anticipate all
forms of discrimination. In enacting section 504, Congress expressed
in as broad language as possible its intention that those receiving
federal assistance should not subject any person to discrimination on
the basis of handicap. It is for the courts, as well as the agencies, to
fashion remedies on a more specific basis to insure that this congres-
sional mandate is fulfilled.61  The federal judiciary had already de-
veloped substantial mechanisms for the protection of civil rights
generally, 62 and Congress may have expected that those same enforce-
ment methods would be applied by the courts to protect the civil rights
of handicapped individuals.6 3
As to the criticism that the creation of a private remedy will flood
the federal courts with too many cases, it must be observed that the
59. Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulator), Statutes, 77 HARv. L. REV.
285, 291 (1963).
60. The Secretary of HEW has included alcoholism and drug addiction in the definition
of "handicap." Analysis of Final Regulation, 42 Fed. Reg. 22,685 (1977).
61. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946): "Where federally protected rights have been
invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their rem-
edies so as to grant the necessary relief." See the discussions by Justice Cardozo in Bemis
Bros. Bag Co. v. United States, 289 U.S. 28, 36 (1933) and by Justice Holmes in The Western
Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 433 (1922).
62. Cf Comment, A Survey of Remedies Under 77tle I'll, 5 COLUMt Hu,%tA RiGirrs L
REv. 437 (1973) (discussing discrimination in employment).
63. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has published a notice of intent
to issue proposed rules for consolidating procedures for administration and enforcement of
several civil rights laws and authorities. 41 Fed. Reg. 18,394 (1976).
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protection of basic human rights against arbitrary discrimination has
long been awarded a preferred position in our federal law,64 and this
protection should be deemed a sufficiently substantial interest to over-
come any inconvenience caused the judicial system. When there are
no other means of enforcement or when established means are in-
adequate, our traditional conception of justice requires that federally-
created rights not be sacrificed to judicial convenience. 65  It is sig-
nificant that even Justice Black, in Bivens, refused to apply his con-
demnation of implied remedies indiscriminately; although decrying the
"growing number of frivolous lawsuits," he reserved approval for
cases . . . brought by citizens with substantial complaints-persons who
are physically or economically injured by torts or frauds or govern-
mental infringement of their rights; persons who have been unjustly
deprived of their liberty or their property; and persom who have not yet
received the equal opportunity in education, employment, and pursuit of
happiness that was the dream of our forefathers.
6
C. Lau v. Nichols: The Civil Rights Exception
The Supreme Court recognized the type of case contemplated by
Justice Black when it decided Lau v. Nichols67 in 1974. In Lau, non-
English-speaking Chinese students claimed that the San Francisco
School District discriminated against them in violation of section 601 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.68 Approximately 1,800 students of
Chinese ancestry in the school system spoke little or no English and
received no supplemental instruction in the English language. The
students complained that the language barrier effectively excluded
them from education and requested that the Board of Education be
ordered to provide them special services-such as English language in-
struction or classes taught in Chinese-so that they could receive an
education equal to that provided students fluent in English.69
Lau was an unusual case.70 Whether a private cause of action
64. The preference for protecting civil rights through federal laws is evidenced not only in
the Constitution itself, U.S. CONsT. amends. XIII, XIV, XV, & XIX, but also by congressional
activity pursuant to those amendments. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42 (1970); 42 U.SC. §§ 1981-83,
1985(3) (1970); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1970). See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265
(1970) wherein the Court stated: "From its founding the Nation's basic commitment has been
to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders,"
65. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946); Marbury v. Madison. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137.
162-63 (1803).
66. 403 U.S. 388, 428 (1971).
67. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970) provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of.
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity rectiving Federal financial as-
sistance."
69. 414 U.S. at 564.
70. The uniqueness of the case is barely suggested by the majority opinion, but is more
fully developed in Justice Stewart's concurrence. Id. at 569 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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could be implied under section 601 depended upon a finding that
"affirmative rights" were conferred by the statute. Section 601
prohibits discrimination against certain classes of persons. This
prohibition is ordinarily understood to apply to the intentional de-
privation of certain persons rights that are accorded others, or the un-
equal treatment of essentially equal classes of persons. The right
conferred by the statute is the right to be treated equally, and the duty
imposed is to refrain from unequal treatment. The facts in Lau, how-
ever, posed a situation that did not fit into this framework. There, the
discrimination complained of resulted from the equal treatment of es-
sentially unequal populations: teaching all students in English de-
prived those unfamiliar with the language of a meaningful education.
The school board, by providing all students with equal services, was
passively working a discrimination against those who were by nature
incapable of making effective use of those services.
To remedy this "passive" discrimination, special services were
required for the Chinese students. In Lau, the Court found that a
higher level of duty-an "affirmative duty"-was imposed on the school
officials. In order to support its holding that the statute imposed such
an affirmative duty, the Court found that the statute conferred an
"affirmative right" on the plaintiffs to receive special services. Observing
that "there is no equality of treatment merely by providing students
with the same facilities, textbooks, teachers, and curriculum; for
students who do not understand English are effectively foreclosed from
any meaningful education, ,71 the Court held that the school district
was discriminating against these students in violation of section 601
and implied a private action in favor of the plaintiffs to enforce the
affimative duties imposed by the statute.
Lau may be viewed, within the context of the development of
the doctrine of implication, on two levels. It stands apart from recent
Supreme Court implication cases since the Court permitted a private
remedy and since nowhere in the majority opinion did its author,
Justice Douglas, refer explicitly to the doctrine of implication or to its
recognized components. Because of this apparent disregard for the
common-law doctrine, Lau might be characterized, first, as the
pronouncement of an entirely new method of implying a private cause
of action. 72 Yet Lau may also be viewed as a permissible application of
the traditional doctrine of implication to a complaint fitting within the
exceptions delineated in Justice Black's dissent in Bivens. Lau was a
case "brought by citizens with substantial complaints . . . persons
71. Id. at 566. The same principle was articulated by Justice Frankfurter in Ne York
v. United States, 331 U.S. 284, 353 (1947): "The Procrustean bed is not a symbol of equality.
It is no less inequality to have equality among unequals."
72. The ramifications of this approach are discussed in, note 101 infra.
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who have not yet received the equal opportunity in education
that was the dream of our forefathers." 3 Although Justice Douglas
made no reference to the common-law doctrine of implication (indeed,
he never stated what analytical method he was using), he did use its
methodology: he looked first to the statute and, finding it ambiguous,
turned to extrinsic sources74 for illumination of its meaning.
Approaching Lau as an exception to the Court's general trend
away from the implication doctrine's frequent application may explain
the Court's failure to refer explicitly to the doctrine in that case. Lau
confronted the Court after it had begun to restrict the application of
the doctrine in Amtrak and SIPC. To allow a cause of action using
the implication doctrine might have been interpreted by lower courts
as the signal of a return to the Warren Court's liberal recognition of
implied private remedies. It is conceivable that the Court, recognizing
that a cause of action was warranted under the facts presented by
Lau, nevertheless chose to refrain from referring to the doctrine by
name to avoid sending such a signal.
The exceptional duty inferred from section 601 may also explain
the lack of reference to the implication doctrine in Lau. The Court
might have been able to apply the more stringent standards it was
developing in other implication decisions to find a duty to refrain from
unequal treatment. But in order to find the higher level of duty re-
quiring affirmative action, it was necessary for the Court to read the
statutory language more liberally-perhaps too liberally to conform to
the Court's conception of proper implication analysis.
While these considerations may have entered into the Lau
analysis, the key to the Lau approach may well lie with its author.
Justice Douglas had in an earlier implication case expressed his
impatience with the labels and doctrines surrounding the issue of
private remedies. In Amtrak, he complained:
The court phrases the question in terms of whether "a right of ac-
tion" exists, saying that no question of "standing" or "jurisdiction" is
presented. Whatever the merits of the distinction between these three
concepts may be in some situations, the difference here is only a matter
of semantics.
We deal here with a federal cause of action and it is the judicial tra-
dition "for federal courts to fashion federal law where federal rights are
concerned.""
73. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. ?88, 428 (1971) (Black, J..
dissenting).
74. Douglas relied primarily, on various HEW regulations interpreting § 601: 45 C.F.R,
§§ 80.3(b)(1), 80.5(b) (1976); 35 Fed. Reg. 11,595 (1970); 33 Fed. Rzg. 4,955 (1968) He also
referred to state statutes, CAL. EDtUC. CODE §§ 8573, 12101 (West Supp, 1973). and to the contract
between the San Francisco School District and the federal government binding the district to
"comply with title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . .'" 414 U.S. at 566-69.
75. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453,
467 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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Justice Douglas criticized the Court's "dedication to legalisms,"7 6
pointing out the similarities between Amtrak and an earlier pro-
implication decision,77 and then stripped the issues down to the equities
involved:
The Court is in the mood to close all possible doors to judicial review so
as to let the existing bureaucracies roll on to their goal of administrative
abselutism. When the victims of administrative venality or administra-
tive caprice are not allowed even to be heard, the abuses of the monsters
we have created will become intolerable. The separation of powers was
designed to provide, not for judicial supremacy, but for checks and
balances. When we turn back this respondent, we turn back passengers
who are the victims of the present transportation debacle. Those who
complain are not adventurers who seek personal aggrandizement as do
jackals who historically have fattened on some economic debacles. The
passengers are the victims of the transportation crisis out of which
Amtrak seeks to make a fortune. . . . I would affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals whether the rationalization be based on standing,
cause of action, or jurisdiction.78
It thus appears that Justice Douglas achieved in Lau what he had want-
ed to achieve in Amtrak. Rather than referring to the complicated net-
work -of "legalisms" developed in the Court's implication decisions,
he addressed afresh the issue whether a cause of action existed under
section 601, and decided, using all means at his disposal-contract
law, state statutory law, and administrative regulations-that it did.
The precedential value of Lau and its position in the development of
the doctrine of implication are uncertain. Nevertheless, it appears
that within the trend away from implied causes of action, Lau may be
viewed as an exception of the sort the dissenters in Bivens envisioned:
a private right of action will be derived from a statute vindicating
constitutionally guaranteed civil rights.
D. Cort v. Ash: Further Restriction and Restatement
The liberal approach taken by Justice Douglas in Lau did not
alter the course charted by the Burger Court restricting the use of the
implication doctrine. In 1975, a unanimous Court consolidated prior
case law79 to reaffirm this trend in Cort v. Ash.80 Prior to the Cort
decision, conflicting policies and standards had been applied to de-
termine when the implication of a private action was warranted.8'
76. Id. at 471.
77. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
78. 414 U.S. at 472.
79. Lau was ignored in this consolidation.
80. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
81. Note, Emerging Standards for Implied Actions under Federal Statutes. 9 U. Mieh.
J. L REF. 294, 295-96 (1976).
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Courts had agreed on the general two-step approach to be taken,
inquiring first whether the particular plaintiff was the beneficiary of
the right conferred by the statute and second whether the statute itself
appeared to be compatible with an implied remedy.82 Nevertheless,
the standards used to obtain answers to these inquiries had conflicted
considerably. Cort established four criteria that, taken together,
were apparently intended to resolve the issue of implication in any
particular case.
The Supreme Court held in Cort that a private cause of action
for damages against corporate directors could not be implied in favor
of a corporate stockholder for violation of section 610 of the Federal
Election Campaign Act, a criminal statute prohibiting corporations
from making "a contribution or expenditure in connection with any
election . . . at which Presidential and Vice Presidential electors
• . . are to be voted foV . . . .4 The Court found that the inter-
vention of amendments to the Act in 1974,85 establishing a Federal
Election Commission with primary jurisdiction over complaints of
section 610 violations, required that plaintiff Ash turn first to the newly
formed Commission for relief.86
Although the Court apparently could have disposed of the case on
the basis of the "exhaustion of remedies" doctrine, it nevertheless
turned to the issue of "whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute
not expressly providing for one," and refuted the holding of the court
of appeals that a private cause of action was proper under section 610.
It articulated a test in four parts:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted," . . .- that is, does the statute create a federal right
in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative
intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or deny one?
. . . Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? . . . And finally, is
the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area
basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to
infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?.8
82. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
83. Note, supra note 81, at 295-96.
84. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970) (repealed, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 201(a), 90 Stat, 496 (1976)).
This provision had formed part of Title 18, "Crimes and Criminal Procedure," and had set lines
and prison sentences for its violation.
85. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1263 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (Supp. IV 1974)),
86. 422 U.S. at 76 n.9.
87. Id. at 78 (emphasis in original). In support of the especial beneficiary requirement,
the Court cited Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916), Regarding legisla-
tive intent, it cited National R.R. Passengers Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414
U.S. 453, 458, 460 (1974). In support of the overall legislative scheme criterion, the Court
cited id., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 423 (1975) and Calhoon
v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964). Finally, regarding the state concern criterion, the Court re-
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These four standards clarify the issues relevant to implication analysis
and represent a tightening of the applicable standards. The criteria
had been applied in various combinations by the Supreme Court in
earlier cases. The Cort opinion indicates that all four must be
separately considered in future analyses. These requirements are far
more stringent than any that had been previously applied, indicating
an effort by the Court to make the implication of private causes of
action a more difficult task than before.
Applying the four criteria to the case before it, the Supreme Court
found that the plaintiff in Cort did not have a private cause of action.
Turning to the second criterion to illuminate the first, the Court de-
termined that the legislative history did not indicate congressional
intent to make the plaintiff an "especial beneficiary" of the statute.
The primary purpose of the Federal Election Campaign Act was found
to be the prevention of the joinder of political power and the wealth of
corporations. Protection of stockholders' investments was of sec-
ondary concern. 8  Ash therefore failed to satisfy the first two criteria
since, suing in his capacity as shareholder, he qualified as a secondary
rather than as an especial beneficiary of the statute. Because the
remedy sought would not aid the primary congressional goal, the Court
also found that the third criterion was not satisfied; the suit did not
further the general purposes of the legislative scheme. Finally, since
state law provided the plaintiff a remedy in the form of an ultra vires
suit, the Court found the area adequately controlled by state law.89
Cort was expected to have established a uniform, nationwide
doctrine that would put an end to the implication doctrine's history of
conflicting standards and unpredictable applications." It has not done
so. Several lower federal courts have adopted the criteria set out in
Cort;91 others have ignored them; 92 and at least one has fused its own
standards with those of Cort.93  The lower courts' varying treatment
ferred the reader to Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963); J.l. Case Co. v. Borak.
377 U.S. 426, 434 (1964); Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents. 403 U.S. 388. 394-95
(1971); and id. at 400 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).
88. 422 U.S. at 81-82.
89. Id. at 85.
90. Note, supra note 81, at 318.
91. See, e.g., Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809. 814-15 (E.D. Pa.
1977); De Jesus Chavez v. LTV Aerospace Corp., 412 F. Supp. 4, 6-7 (N.D. Tex. 1976); Rauch V.
United Instruments, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 442, 444-46 (E.D. Pa. 1975). rev'd, 548 F.2d 452 (3d Cir.
1976); Moen v. Las Vegas Int. Hotel, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 157, 161-62 (D. Nev. 1975), qd. 554
F.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1977); Jones v. United States, 401 F. Supp. 168. 171 (E.D. Ark. 1975),
aff'd 536 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 735 (1977); Sierra Club v. Morton.
400 F. Supp. 610, 622-25 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
92. See, e.g., Evans v. Kerbs & Co., 411 F. Supp. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Hibernia Bank v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 411 F. Supp. 478 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Brennan v. Emerald Reno-
vators, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Guernsey v. Rich Plan. 408 F. Supp. 582
(N.D. Ind. 1976); Rogers v. Exxon Research, 404 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1975), vacated, 550
F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977).
93. Traylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 871 (N.D. CaL 1975).
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of Cort can be traced in part to the fact that the Cort standards
constitute dicta. Because Ash's claim was disposed of by the inter-
vening law that relegated the complaint to the Federal Election
Commission for initial review, discussion of the possibility of a private
remedy was superfluous to the holding and served only to support
the conclusion already drawn.
Nevertheless, the four-part Cort test carries great weight with
lower courts presented with implication issues because it comprises
the only attempt to synthesize the contradictory reasoning of prior
cases and the only expression of comprehensive guidelines by the
United States Supreme Court.94  At the very least, it must be recog-
nized as a definitive statement that the Burger Court will tolerate
fewer implied actions. 95
III. THE Lloyd OPINION
A. The Seventh Circuit's Analysis
Lloyd involved a class action suit brought by two "mobility-
handicapped" citizens96 of Illinois against the Regional Transportation
Authority and the Chicago Transit Authority. The plaintiffs sought to
compel local transportation authorities to take affirmative steps to
provide special services to mobility-handicapped persons.9' The
cause of action asserted under section 50498 presented the issue
whether the language of section 504 conferred on the plaintiffs a right
to sue the transportation authorities. The district court had deter-
mined that section 504 did not allow plaintiffs "to enforce a policy of
affirmative action in favor of handicapped persons" and that this ab-
sence of an affirmative action requirement deprived them of a cause of
action under the statute.99 The court of appeals vacated the judg-
ment and remanded the case, holding that the statute imposed a duty
of affirmative action and that a private cause of action was implicit in
the statute. 00
94. Note, supra note 81, at 302.
95. McMahon & Rodos, supra note 51, at 185-87.
96. Plaintiff George A. Lloyd, a quadriplegic confined to a wheelchair, and Janet B.
Wolfe, mobility-disabled because of a chronic pulmonary dysfunction, sued on behalf of all
mobility-disabled persons in northeastern Illinois, alleging that their class was excluded from
public transportation because of physical disabilities.
97. A preliminary injunction was requested to prohibit the defendants from designing
or placing into operation any federally funded facilities not accessible to mobility-handicapped
persons; a mandatory injunction was sought to compel them to make the existing system ac-
cessible.
98. Three other bases for recovery were relied upon by the plaintiffs: § 16 of the Urban
Mass Transportation Act of 1964, 49 U.S.C. § 1612 (1976); §§ I and 2 of the Architectural
Barriers Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151-52 (1973), and the equal prolection clause of the four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution, Deciding the case on the basis of § 504,
the Court did not reach these other causes of action.
99. Lloyd v. Illinois Regional Transp. Auth., No. 75-C1834 (N.D. It., March 16, 1976).
100. Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1284-85 (7th Cir. 1977).
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In reaching these conclusions, the circuit court undertook the
difficult task of harmonizing Lau with Cort. Lau was relevant because
it involved a statute with language similar to section 504 and implied
a cause of action based on an affirmative duty to provide special ser-
vices. As in Lau, the discrimination in Lloyd resulted from admittedly
equal treatment of unequal populations. Thus, before a right to sue
under section 504 could be found, it was necessary in Lloyd to
determine that an affirmative duty was implicit in the statute. Just as
the school board in Lau needed to provide special services to non-
English-speaking students to rectify the inequality inherent in the
provision of equal services, it was necessary for the transit authorities
in Lloyd to provide special services for mobility-handicapped persons
in order to counteract the discrimination inherent in the provision of
equal transportation facilities. Because of the strong parallels be-
tween the Lau and Lloyd facts, the Seventh Circuit might have relied
exclusively on Lau to find a private cause of action in Lloyd.
Yet the Seventh Circuit in examining these facts after the Cort de-
cision, recognized that the Cort opinion also had relevance because
it articulated the means for determining whether a private action could
be implied from a regulatory statute. Therefore Judge Cummings
divided his analysis into two parts: first, he relied on Lau to determine
that section 504 confers affirmative rights on handicapped individuals;
second, having found these rights, he applied the four-part Cort test
to determine that a private cause of action could be implied to vindi-
cate them.10'
101. Id. at 1285. This two-part analysis, however, is not without ambiguity. Some lan-
guage in the opinion suggests that Judge Cummings may have found the implied right of action
based on Lau alone and that the Cort analysis is only supportive. Although the ULlod court
applied the doctrine as described in Cort, it suggested in two places that Cort may not have been
indispensable to its holding-a holding that appears to have been determined exclusively by re-
liance on Lau. Before making any mention of Cort, the Seventh Circuit pronounced its
holding. "Lau is dispositive. Therefore, we hold that section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
at least when considered with the regulations which now implement it, establishes affirmative
rights and permits this action to proceed." 428 F.2d at 1281. And at the conclusion of
the discussion of the four Cort criteria, the court indicated that Cort was merely supportive
of the holding already made under Law "Because all four Cort tests are satisfied, we are rein-
forced in our holding that Section 504 implicitly provides a private remedy." Id. at 1287.
This language, together with the Lau decision, suggests that an attempt may be underway to
develop a new mode of analysis to supplant the doctrine of implication or circumvent its re-
strictive use in civil rights cases in which affirmative rights are involved.
Assuming this is a new mode, it appears to consist of the recognition of an affirmative duty
imposed on the regulated party by a statute and the inference of a right to sue to enforce that
duty. The inference of a private action appears to flow automatically from the existence of the
affirmative right. This method represents a return to the original common law implication
rationale: a right is discovered in a statute and a remedy is recognized to vindicate that right.
See note 34 supra and accompanying text. It avoids the complex standards developed in re-
cent decisions and consolidated in Cort: the plaintiff's status as especial beneficiary, the
applicability of the expressio unius maxim to other remedies expressed in the statute, the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme and the efficacy of analogous state enforcement.
Some of these issues may be examined in connection with the search for an affirmative right.
yet once that right is established, the remedy is a natural consequence.
Why a new approach is sought is speculative. The reasons advanced for Justice Douglas'
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1. The Affirmative Rights of Handicapped Individuals
Judge Cummings found that Lau mandated the conclusion that
section 504 creates affirmative rights in favor of handicapped individuals
because the language of section 601 is nearly identical to the language
in section 504. 102 To buttress his conclusion, Judge Cummings at-
tempted to refute the district court reasoning with regard to the Lau
decision and thereby deviated from his otherwise accurate implica-
tion analysis. The district court had found that Lau did not govern
the question of affirmative rights under section 504, because in Lau the
"obligation to provide special programs did not flow from the cited
statutory language [section 601] but rather from Health, Education,
and Welfare guidelines which were enacted pursuant to the additional
statutory section, § 2000d-1 [section 602]. "t°3 Since no analogs to the
HEW guidelines had been promulgated under section 504 at the time
of the district court decision in Lloyd, the Lau reasoning was con-
sidered by the trial court to be inapplicable. Judge Cummings, how-
ever, explained that analogous administrative guidelines were indeed
extant, having emerged in developments subsequent to the district
court decision: Executive Order 119141°4 authorized HEW to adopt
rules and regulations to ensure compliance with section 504, and the
failure in Lau to refer to the doctrine of implication by name may also explain a new method
of implication permitting desired actions more readily than the increasingly restrictive
implication doctrine. The Supreme Court's refusals in Amtrak. SIFC and Cori to allow con-
ventional implication in favor of plaintiffs indicate its desire to restrict the doctrine to such an
extent that it has minimal application in areas of economic regulation. An undesirable by-
product of a conscientious application of the restrictive Cori standards would be the foreclosure
of private actions under civil rights statutes such as § 601 of the Civil Rights Act and § 504
of the Rehabilitation Act, areas in which a private action may be vieued as a desirable com-
plement to administrative regulation. To insure the continued availobility of private action" to
enforce civil rights statutes and at the same time preserve the restriction of private remedies
generally, the courts in Lau and Lloyd may have found it appropriate to fashion the new mode
of analysis.
Another related reason may follow from the facts peculiar to both cases, In Lut the
lower courts had denied relief because the students' lack of proficiency in English "was not
caused directly or indirectly by any state action." Lau v, Nichols. 483 F.2d 791. 798 (1973)
Similarly, in L/oyd, the provision of equal transportation services excluded handicapped per-
sons from services altogether. In both cases, the respective statutes clearly imposed a duty not
to discriminate, but in order to find a higher level of duty to provide special services to counter-
act inadvertant discrimination, it was imperative that more be read iHto the statutory language,
Hence, the search for an "affirmative right" demanded a more liberal reading of the statute.
This liberal reading would be inconsistent with the current trend in implication analysis toward
a strict reading of statutory language.
If Lau does represent an alternative to the traditional implication methodology, Lovid
demonstrates how this alternative may be used in subsequent cases. A plaintiff suing under
section 504 or a similar statute, who is subjected to discrimination by the failure to observe
an affimative duty, would need to demonstrate only that an affirmative right is established by the
statute by pointing to its history, its regulations, local state law or any other source, The con-
ventional principle ubi jus ibi remedium would then apply to award a private remedy
For a recent district court analysis which appears to follow this approach. see Barncs v.
Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1977).
102. 548 F.2d at 1281.
103. No. 75-C1834, at 7 (N.D. I11. Mar. 16. 1976).
104. 3 C.F.R. 117 (1977).
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Urban Mass Transit Administration (UMTA) guidelinesl0 s established
affirmative duties to provide special transportation services for the
handicapped.
By relying on these administrative developments, the Seventh
Circuit was able to imply a private right of action from the statute
and regulations together, thereby avoiding a conclusion that section
504 alone provided the action:
Lau is dispositive. Therefore, we hold that Section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act, at least when considered with the regulations which now im-
plement it, establishes affirmative rights . . . . Even though the opinion
of the Court in Lau can be read as authority for allowing this action to
proceed under section 504 .. .alone, developments subsequent to the
district court's opinion have provided a virtual one-to-one correspondence
between the conceptual props supporting the concurring opinion in Lau
and the elements of the instant case.'06
2. The Cort Implication Doctrine
Having established that affirmative rights exist under section 504,
Judge Cummings embarked upon an inquiry whether a private cause
of action could be implied to vindicate those rights, using the four-
part Cort test. The deftness with which the court appears to have
handled the first Cort criterion-"[p]laintiffs of course are among the
class specifically benefited by the enactment of the statute"°7L-is
deceptive. The ten-page discussion devoted to establishing the exis-
tence of affirmative rights was indispensable to this conclusion.
Why the court in Lloyd devoted so much of its discussion to the
first Cort standard can be explained by the great stringency with which
this standard had been applied in Cort and by the higher level of duty
required to establish affirmative rights under section 504. The first
standard is described in Cort as follows: "[I]s the plaintiff 'one of the
class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,' . . . -that is,
does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?" 10 As
articulated, this standard actually involves a double inquiry. In order
to answer this question affirmatively, it must be determined that: 1) a
federal right is created by the statute; and 2) the plaintiff is the
especial beneficiary of this right.1t 9 In Cort, special emphasis was
placed on the second prong of this inquiry-the plaintiff was not re-
garded as an "especial beneficiary" of the Election Campaign Act.
In Lloyd, on the other hand, plaintiffs' status as especial beneficiaries
was not in doubt. Instead, the character of the right created by the
105. 49 C.F.R. §§ 609.1-25, 613.204 (1976).
106. 548 F.2d 1277, 1281 (7th Cir. 1977).
107. Id. at 1285.
108. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (emphasis in original).
109. Note, Implication of Private Actions from Federal Stattes: From Borak to Ash. I J
CORP. L. 371, 376 (1975-76).
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statute posed difficulties. In order to find an affirmative right under
section 504 it was necessary for the court to read more into the statute
than would have been necessary to find a nonaffirmative right. The
circuit court devoted the bulk of its discussion in Lloy'd to the search
for affirmative rights under the statute, then incorporated that search
into its analysis of the first Cort standard, stating simply that "[a]s
demonstrated above, Section 504 establishes affirmative private
rights. ' 110
Once the first standard of the Cort test was met, the other three
appeared to fall easily into place. The court found that "there is
surely an indication of legislative intent to create such a remedy and
none to deny it." ' But the dearth of history surrounding the draft-
ing of section 504 compelled the court to turn to elucidation of the
section provided after its passage in the legislative discussion of the
1974 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act. As the opinion observes,
these amendments "redefined the term 'handicapped individual' as
used in Section 504 and, as clarifying amendments, have cogent sig-
nificance in construing ' 1 that section. The legislative discussion of
the 1974 amendments stresses the selection of language in section
504, identical to section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and section
901 of the Education Amendments of 1973, and indicates Congress'
intention that the enforcement of section 504 should closely parallel
implementation under those other sections, including private enforce-
ment. "This approach to implementation of section 504, which
closely follows the models of the above-cited anti-discrimination
provisions, would ensure administrative due process . . . . provide
for administrative consistency within the Federal government as well
as relative ease of implementation, and permit a judicial remedy
through a private action."' 1 3 This language, read by the Seventh Cir-
cuit to refer to post-administrative judicial review, nevertheless indi-
cated to the court that "it is plain that the rights of the handicapped
were meant to be enforced at some point through the vehicle of a
private cause of action."'1 4  Moreover, the court recognized that
"rwlhen administrative machinery does not exist to vindicate an
affirmative right, there can be no objection to an independent cause of
action in the federal courts."" 5 Accordingly, it was determined that
the second Cort criterion was met.
The third criterion of the Cort test requires that it be consistent
with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply a
110. 548 F.2d at 1285.
111. Id. at 1286.
112. Id. at 1285.
113. S. REp. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CO. o. & AD,
NEws 6373, 6391.
114. 548 F.2d at 1286.
115. Id.
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remedy. Pointing to one of the expressed purposes of the Rehabilita-
tion Act to "enforce statutory and regulatory standards and require-
ments regarding barrier-free construction of public facilities and study
and develop solutions to existing architectural and transportation
barriers impeding handicapped individuals," 16 the Seventh Circuit in
Lloyd found that the underlying purpose of the Rehabilitation Act
would be served by allowing the implication of a private cause of
action under section 504. Since an implied right of action would
serve to enforce the uniform standards envisioned by Congress, "the
unseemly vista of a spotty application of ad hoc remedies . ..would
not occur."'"1
7
Finally, because it was conceded in argument that "it was the
intent of Congress to deal with the transportation needs of the handi-
capped on a national basis," '' H Ll.vd did not present a type of injury
traditionally remedied under state law. Thus, the circumstances of
Lloyd satisfied all the standards articulated in Cori.
B. Critique of the Lloyd Analysis
Lloyd appears to contain a broad holding. At several points the
court makes flat statements to the effect that "Section 504 implicitly
provides a private remedy."'' 9 However, because it relied heavily on
the UMTA regulations to find the implied right, rather than deriving
the right of action squarely under the statute, the court's opinion is
misleading and much more cautious than the holding would admit.
Concerning the first Cort standard, the Seventh Circuit held that
"Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, at least when considered with
the regulations which now implement it, establishes affirmative rights
. . .,,120 The UMTA regulations dealt only with the rights of handi-
capped individuals to have access to public transportation, and the
Seventh Circuit found that the affirmative rights guaranteed by section
504 applied particularly to transportation barriers. It further found
that a private action would be consistent with the purposes underly-
ing the statutory and administrative scheme to eliminate architectural
and transportation barriers and would enforce standards for public
transportation systems established by UMTA and HEW regulations.,
It held that mass transit is not an area traditionally subject to state
regulation.122 All of these findings relate only to the rights of handi-
capped individuals to have access to public transportation although
116. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1975).
117. 548 F.2d at 1286.
118. Id. at 1286-87.
119. Id. at 1287. See id. at 1281.
120. Id. at 1281.
121. Id. at 1286.
122. Id. at 1286-87.
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section 504 clearly confers rights upon disabled persons with respect
to all types of federally funded programs. Only with regard to the leg-
islative intent to allow private remedies is the Lloyd reasoning as broad
as its ostensible holding that the statutory section itself provides the
private cause of action.
A disturbing consequence emerges from the Seventh Circuit's
heavy reliance on the regulatory language: a judicial remedy arises
only after the regulations issue, when this remedy can serve in a sup-
plementary capacity only. The implied cause of action, which is the
sole channel designed to provide private redress and enforce a public
duty before administrative regulations are issued, is withheld until
those regulations appear.
It was improper and unnecessary to propound a rule of law with
such ironic consequences. Administrative regulations may serve to
set standards and guidelines delineating the scope of a statutory right
and aiding in the determination of whether a violation of the statute
has indeed occurred. But it is the statute, as an expression of congres-
sional authority, which creates the right upon which a handicapped
person must rely in court.1 23 If a private remedy can be implied under
a statute, it is important to do so directly, so that the intended bene-
ficiaries of the legislative enactment have a remedy before the admin-
istrative agency promulgates regulations or when administrative en-
forcement is inadequate. The Seventh Circuit could have employed
the doctrine of implication as it had developed at the time of the Lloyd
appeal to derive the cause of action squarely under the statute.
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit chose to chart a new course by
scouring the administrative guidelines for authority for a private rem-
edy rather than by applying the ready and established means for mak-
ing such a determination under section 504-the doctrine of implica-
tion. A closer look at the Lloyd analysis reveal; why the Seventh
Circuit took the course it did.
The Seventh Circuit's failure to apply the implication doctrine
properly can be traced to the court's recognition that in order to satisfy
the first inquiry of the four-part Cort test it was necessary to deter-
mine that affirmative rights were established by section 504. The court
did so by relying on the Lau decision. It placed particular emphasis
on the concurring opinions in Lau, reading them to require adminis-
trative guidelines similar to those used in Lau as a prerequisite to the
finding of an affirmative right. In examining the executive order and
123. The only example of an administrative rule spoken of by courts as the source of an
implied cause of action is rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5 (1977), promulgated pursuant
to § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1970), See, e.g., Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co,. 69
F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). Although no court has actually so held, an implied cause of
action may exist under rule lOb-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1977), promulgated under the same
statute. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, 97 S. Ct. 926, 950-52 (1977).
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the UMTA guidelines, for example, Judge Cummings sought a "one-
to-one correspondence between the conceptual props supporting the
concurring opinions in Lau and the elements of the instant case. 12 4
And again at the end of his affirmative rights discussion, he concluded
that "every element of the two concurring opinions in Lau is also
satisfied under the statutory and administrative framework of the in-
stant case." 125
This concern for the concurring opinions in Lau may at first
appear curious. 126  However, the majority opinion failed to explain
adequately the issue presented and the method of reasoning used to
resolve that issue. Justice Stewart's concurrence clarified the problem
posed by the facts in Lau: the necessity of establishing affirmative
rights in favor of the plaintiffs before a right to sue could be implied.
Perhaps the circuit court also considered Justice Stewart's opinion
more reflective of the Supreme Court's restrictive attitude towards
implication.12 7 Nevertheless, the emphasis in Lloyd on Justice Stew-
art's concurrence in Lau reads too much into that opinion. This
becomes clear from an examination of Justice Stewart's reasoning.
Justice Stewart questioned whether section 601, "standing alone,
would render illegal the expenditure of federal funds," pointing out
that rather than affirmatively or intentionally discriminating, the school
district merely "failed to act in the face of changing social and lin-
guistic patterns." He continued: "On the other hand, the interpretive
guidelines published by the Office for Civil Rights . . . clearly indi-
cate that affirmative efforts to give special training for non-English
speaking pupils are required by Tit. VI as a condition to receipt of
federal aid to public schools."12 8 It is most likely that this language
led the court in Lloyd to search for administrative guidelines and to
refuse to find a cause of action in section 504 alone. Nevertheless,
this reading of Justice Stewart's concurrence in Lau is erroneous, for
on closer examination it becomes evident that Justice Stewart did not
read the regulations as providing the right, but only, in their inter-
pretive capacity, as clarifying that the right exists in the statute.
Indeed, his word choice carefully avoids any indication that the right
derives from the regulations. He found that the text of section 601
was "not entirely clear" about the requirement of special services,
and, turning to the administrative guidelines for explication of the stat-
ute, he found that they indicated that affirmative efforts were indeed
"required by Title VI.', 129  This interpretive aspect of the guidelines
124. 548 F.2d at 1281.
125. Id. at 1284.
126. Lau was a unanimous decision. Four justices joined the majority opinion of Justice
Douglas; the others concurred in the result.
127. Justice Stewart wrote the Amtrak opinion denying an implied cause of action.
128. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 570 (1974) (Stewart, J. concurring).
129. Id. (emphasis added).
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is underscored by Justice Stewart's view of the issue involved: "The
critical question is, therefore, whether the regulations and guidelines
promulgated by HEW go beyond the authority of § 601.,, 130 He con-
cluded that they did not, and that "[t]he Department has reasonably
and consistently interpreted § 601 to require affirmative remedial ef-
forts to give special attention to linguistically deprived children."''
Indeed, Justice Stewart's approach does not conflict with the majority
opinion, which stated explicitly that the decision to reverse the lower
court was based "solely on § 601 of the Civil Rights Act."' 32
In Lau, it was necessary to examine the administrative guidelines
in their explicative capacity in order to determine whether an af-
firmative right to sue for special treatment was required by the stat-
ute. Contrary to the district court's conclusion and the circuit court's
tacit assumption in Lloyd, however, that right derived ultimately from
the statute, not from the guidelines. Had this been recognized by
the Lloyd court, it could have enunciated a more generous and less
cautious holding that would nonetheless have been consistent with
prior implication analysis.
IV. THE HEW REGULATIONS
After the circuit court decision in Lloyd, final regulations were
issued under section 504, providing for extensive voluntary compli-
ance on the part of recipients of federal assistance and government
enforcement on the part of the Office of Civil Rights. 133 These regula-
tions apply to each recipient of federal financial assistance from the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and to each program
or activity that receives or benefits from such assistance. In the
area of employment practices, the regulations prohibit discrimination
in recruitment, hiring, compensation, job assignment and classification,
and fringe benefits and require employers to make reasonable ac-
commodation for qualified handicapped applicants and employees.
All programs are to be made accessible to handicapped persons. Pre-
school, elementary, and secondary education is to be provided each
qualified handicapped child in the most normal setting appropriate.
Recruitment, admission, and treatment after admission to post-secon-
dary educational institutions are to be conducted on a nondiscrimina-
tory basis, and colleges and universities are required to adjust aca-
demic requirements and existing programs to insure that handicapped
persons are not effectively excluded from higher education. Hospi-
tals and other recipients providing health, welfare, and social service
programs must make adjustments to abolish discrimination and af-
130. Id. at 571.
131. Id. (emphasis added).
132. Id. at 566.
133. 45 C.F.R. § 84 (1977).
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ford access to their programs. In addition to governing Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare programs, the HEW regulations will serve as a
basis for guidelines to be issued by the Department to other depart-
ments and agencies of the federal government that are affected by
section 504.
The HEW regulations incorporate by reference the Department's
enforcement procedures under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.34 These procedures encourage voluntary compliance, permit
investigation by the Department, and allow for an administrative
hearing and a termination of federal funding upon a finding of a re-
fusal to comply. Judicial review of the administrative action may be
had pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act."35  Implementa-
tion of the regulations promises finally to set in motion the overdue
enforcement of the rights guaranteed to handicapped persons by Con-
gress four years ago.
The regulations, though not specifically providing for a private
cause of action, do not preclude continued private enforcement in the
courts. Thus, the theoretical weakness of the Lloyd decision remains
problematical. To be sure, courts could use the Lloyd decision to
grant relief to plaintiffs in areas other than transportation, basing their
results on the new and extensive HEW regulations. 36 However, this
is inconsistent with the common law doctrine of implication, which,
even after Cort, retains enough vitality to accommodate a cause of
action under section 504 alone. The deus ex machina of the new
regulations does not excuse the failure of the Lloyd court to apply
the implication doctrine properly. Courts presented with the issue of
whether a private cause of action is implied in section 504 should
undertake an independent examination of the provision in light of the
Supreme Court's restatement of the doctrine in Cori and other cases.
134. 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.6-.10; 45 C.F.R. § 81.1-.131 (1976).
135. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
136. At least three cases decided since Lloyd have relied on its reasoning without under-
taking an independent analysis of § 504 itself. In Bartels v. Biernat, the court had imposed a
preliminary injunction against various Milwaukee and federal transit officials and permitted a
class action to proceed, without discussion of whether or not a cause of action existed under
§ 504. 405 F. Supp. 1012 (E.D. Wisc. 1975). In subsequent proceedings, that court sustained
the plaintiffs' cross motions for summary judgment, declaring the defendants to be in violation of.
inter alia, § 504, and permanently enjoined operation of the system until defendants could dem-
onstrate that special efforts were made to provide equivalent access to the system for handi-
capped persons. Lloyd was cited for the holding that "section 504 . . . does create a private
cause of action," and the court found that "[tlhe Lloyd case dictates that the federal defen-
dants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and for
failure of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted should be denied."
Bartels v. Biernat, No. 75-C-704 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 14. 1977).
Two other cases are United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre. 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977)
(awarding an implied cause of action); and Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc.. 433 F. Supp. 200 (N.D.
Tex. 1977) (denying an implied cause of action). But see the independent analysis undertaken
in Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1977). Lloyd is also cited in
Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184, 188 (3d Cir. 1977).
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V. PROPOSED METHOD OF IMPLYING A CAUSE OF ACTION
UNDER SECTION 504
A. The Especial Beneficiary of Affirmative Rights
and Legislative Intent
The first Cort standard requires that the plairtiff be the especial
beneficiary of the statute. In Cort and its predecessors, this standard
was met by an examination, first of the text and then of the legislative
history of the statute, in order to ascertain the primary motivation
behind the law.1 37 An examination of section 504 within this analyti-
cal framework reveals that it was unnecessary for the Seventh Circuit
in Lloyd, in satisfying the first Cort standard, to look for administra-
tive guidelines conferring affirmative rights. The guidelines, though of
assistance under the Lloyd facts, were superfluouS to the, finding of
affirmative rights under section 504. Two other paths to that end were
available-through the Lau decision and through the conventional
implication inquiry employed in Cort.
First, the Supreme Court in Lau had determined that affirmative
duties which were enforceable by private suits were established by an
antidiscrimination statute with the following wording: "No person in
the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Fed-
eral financial assistance. ' 38  Given the Lau holding, the Seventh Cir-
cuit might have reasoned that the same rights and duties of an affirma-
tive nature flowed also from the virtually identical language of section
504: "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United
States, . . . shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance."'3 9
Second, following the approach taken by the Supreme Court in
Cort, the court in Lloyd might have examined the second criterion
for implying a private cause of action-legislative intent-to illuminate
the first. The concept embodied in section 504 was first introduced
by Senators Humphrey and Percy and Representative Vanik as an
amendment to section 601 of the Civil Rights Act to include handi-
capped individuals among those protected by that statute. 40  Senator
137. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 85. See Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S.
191 (1967); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Texas & Pae. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby. 241
U.S. 33 (1916); Western v. Hodgson, 359 F. Supp. 194 (S.D. W. Va. 1973), afld. 494 F.2d 379
(4th Cir. 1974).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
139. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1975).
140. H.R. 12154, 92 Cong., Ist Sess., 117 CONG. REc. 45945 (1972); S. 3044, 92d Cong
2d Sess. 118 CONG. REC. 526 (1972), introduced on Jan. 20, 1972, would have inserted "physi-
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Humphrey subsequently sanctioned the incorporation of this bill into
legislation concerning reorganization of the rehabilitation program,
noting that it preserved the intent of the original bill:
I am deeply gratified at the inclusion of these provisions, which carry
through the intent of original bills which I introduced jointly with the
Senator from Illinois (Mr. Percy), earlier this year, S.3044 and S.3458,
to amend, respectively, Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, to guarantee the right of persons with a mental or physical handi-
cap to participate in programs receiving Federal assistance ... 4
As the Seventh Circuit recognized, the fullest elaboration of congres-
sional intent regarding section 504 occurred after its enactment,
during consideration of amendments to the Act in 1974. Already
distressed at the absence of enforcement of the antidiscrimination
142sections , the full Committee on Labor and Public Welfare made
numerous changes intended to broaden the class of persons protected
and to remove any doubts about the broad implementation contemplated
by Congress. Noting that section 601 of the Civil Rights Act served
as a model for section 504, the Committee's report states:
It [section 504] does not specifically require the issuance of regulations
or expressly provide for enforcement procedures, but it is clearly manda-
tory in form, and such regulations and enforcement were intended.
The language of section 504, in follow 9 [sic] the above-cited Acts,
further envisions the implementation of a compliance program which is
similar to those Acts, including promulgation of regulations .. . .at-
tempts to bring non-complying recipients into voluntary compliance
* . , and the imposition of sanctions .. . .Such sanctions would in-
clude, where appropriate, the termination of Federal financial assistance
to the recipient or other means otherwise authorized by law. . . .This
approach to implementation of section 504 . . . would . . . permit a
judicial remedy through a private action. 3
Section 504, read in the light of this legislative history, indicates that
Congress intended that a person injured by a violation of the provi-
sion's mandate be permitted to benefit from a private judicial remedy:
By using either or both of these methods-analogizing from Lau
or examining the legislative history of section 504, the Lloyd court
could have satisfied the first standard of the Cort test by finding a
duty of an affirmative nature imposed by the statute itself. This analysis
also satisfies the second Cori requirement since it discloses that Con-
cal or mental handicap," immediately after "color" and "unless lack of such physical or
mental handicap is a bona .ide qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
such program or activity" after "Federal financial assistance," and would have added a section
defining physical or mental handicap.
141. 118 CONG. REc. 32310 (1972).
142. Section 504 is one of four sections meant to alleviate discrimination of various kinds
against handicapped persons. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-794 (Supp. V 1975).
143. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD,
NEws 6373, 6390 (emphasis added).
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gress specifically referred to a private cause of action in its discussion
of contemplated implementation mechanisms.
B. Underlying Purposes of the Legislative Scheme
Over the course of the development of the implication doctrine,
the courts have evolved several considerations to aid in determining
whether a private action harmonized with the overall legislative
scheme: 1) whether a private suit would frustrate the goals of Congress
in enacting the statute; 44 2) whether the remedy would be a valuable
supplement to otherwise inadequate enforcement; 145 3) whether the
threat of private suit would aid in deterring violation of the statute; 46
and 4) whether the remedy would interfere with the primary juris-
diction of the responsible agency.
1 47
Applying these considerations to section 504, it appears that a
private remedy would indeed fall within the legislative scheme.
Under section 504, there is no frustration of goals such as was fatal in
Amtrak, in which a private suit was expected to hamper the congres-
sional policies of efficient elimination of unproductive routes and pres-
ervation of the passenger rail system. 48  In SIPC, in which a primary
purpose of the statute was found to be the stabilization of the securi-
ties business by halting the domino effect that failing brokerages have
on other brokerages, the Court denied a remedy against a failing
brokerage because private suits against failing brokerages would
further destabilize the industry. Thus, a private remedy would have
worked at cross purposes with the legislative scheme.'4 9  No such
delicate interrelations govern the policy behind section 504. The
purpose, as revealed by an examination of the legislative intent, is
to prevent discrimination against handicapped persons by all recipients
of federal funds. A private remedy would not conflict with this goal.
Rather, a private remedy would effectively supplement inade-
quate administrative enforcement. Budget projections for the 1977
fiscal year demonstrate that minimal enforcement procedures are
contemplated by the Office of Civil Rights. t5" While it is too soon to
144. See Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour. 421 U.S 412 (1975): National
R.R. Passengers Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers. 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
145. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969): Carey v, General Elee, Co.
315 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 908 (1964); Fitzgerald v. Pan Am World
Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 499, 502 (2d Cir. 1956).
146. See Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby. 241 U.S. 33, 41-42 (1916).
147. See T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 472-74 (1959): Montana-Dakota
Utils. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251 (1951).
148. National R.R. Passengers Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S, 453,
461-64 (1974).
149. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412. 415, 421-23 (1975).
150. The Office of Civil Rights (OCR) is responsible for enforcement of § 504 after the
regulations issue. It is responsible also for enforcement of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, §§ 799A and 945 of the Public Health
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evaluate the adequacy of the enforcement mechanisms set up under
the HEW regulations for section 504, the experience of administra-
tive enforcement procedures in other regulatory areas is instructive.
Due to inadequate resources, administrative agencies have established
a pattern of selective enforcement aiming only at the most flagrant
violations. The Secretary of Labor, for example, was able to in-
vestigate less than 4% of the employment establishments covered by
the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1973.51 In J.L Case Co. v. Borak,1
52
the Supreme Court acknowledged that the Securities Exchange Com-
mission could not adequately examine the 2000 proxy statements it
received annually. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
cited the notorious overcrowding of the National Labor Relations
Board's docket as a reason for permitting judicial remedies in the labor
relations field. 53 There is no reason to assume that the record of the
Office of Civil Rights will prove to be any more illustrious than those of
other agencies.
Moreover, the threat of private suit might effectively deter further
violations of section 504. If potential violators are faced with only a
slight chance of being penalized for their conduct owing to selective
administrative enforcement, there is clearly little motivation to comply
with the statutory standard. But the existence of a possible civil
penalty may provide the incentive required for the "voluntary" com-
pliance envisioned by HEW in its regulations.
It may be that HEW will be deemed to possess primary juris-
diction over complaints of section 504 violations, requiring a court to
refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after HEW has made its
determination with respect to each complaint.'5 4  Perhaps, also, a
complainant may be required to exhaust state and federal adminis-
trative remedies before a court will accept jurisdiction over the
cause.'55 Yet the doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been held not
to bar actions in areas normally covered by it when discrimination 56
Service Act, and Executive Order 11246. OCR's proposed plan, devoted to the "elimination
of the backlog of complaints" as well as the "conduct of an effective compliance program."
projects that of 539 "professional person years" to be devoted to compliance uork. 29 uill be
expended on the investigation of complaints under § 504 in the fiscal year 1977. 41 Fed. Reg.
41,776 (1976).
151. Employees v. Missouri Pub. Health Dep't, 411 U.S. 279. 287 (1973) (Marshall. J..
concurring).
152. 377 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1964).
153. Carey v. General Elec. Co., 315 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir. 1963).
154. Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809, 817 (E.D. Pa. 1977). See
generally 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 19.01 (1958).
155. See Lewis v. Western Airlines, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
156. Compare Transport-Communication Employees Union v. Union Pac. R.R.. 385 U.S.
157 (1966) and Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R. Co., 339 U.S. 239 (1950) (noting primary
jurisdiction of the National Railroad Adjustment Board under the Railway Labor Act. 45 U.S.C.
§ 153 (1972)) with Norman v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 414 F.2d 73 (8th Cir. 1969) (action permitted
alleging discrimination against train porters under the Civil Rights Act).
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or other civil rights violations5 7 are at issue. In Lau, the Supreme
Court did not find that either the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies posed an obsta-
cle to its jurisdiction over a complaint based on section 601 of the
Civil Rights Act;' 58 other courts have rejected the two doctrines in
connection with the Civil Rights Act. 59 The Supreme Court's treat-
ment of section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Lau is indica-
tive of the proper treatment of section 504, because the administrative
enforcement procedures under the two sections are identical.
C. Traditional State Concern
Finally, Cort requires that the cause of action not be one tradi-
tionally relegated to state law. Again focusing on the narrow area
covered by the UMTA guidelines rather than that covered by the
statute, the court in Lloyd accepted that Congress intended the trans-
portation needs of the handicapped to be handled on a national basis.
Yet in determining the propriety of a cause of action under a federal
statute in relation to state law, courts generally focus their attention
on the statute in its relation to the state interest involved and on the
existence of state remedies.
When a statute is intended to be an intrusion of federal law into
an area of substantial federal concern, a private action will often be
implied.1 60  Several states have enacted laws that guarantee equal
treatment for the handicapped. 161 Yet the interest of the United States
in insuring uniformly equal treatment of all its citizens has clearly been
a matter of federal concern since the addition of the fourteenth amend-
ment to the Constitution. 16
2
Thus, the use of the traditional implication analysis, even as lim-
ited by Cort, demonstrates that the Cort criteria are flexible enough
to allow implication of a cause of action under section 504 alone,
157. See, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970) (inequality in welfare distribu-
tions).
158. The Court in Lau did not discuss the question whether primary jurisdiction or ex-
haustion precluded their review. The fact that the Court did not risc either issue on its own
motion suggests that these doctrines were considered too insubstantial to bar or postpone the
exercise of judicial jurisdiction in that case.
159. See Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S. 956 (1970) (suit permitted under Title VI): Dent v.
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969) (suit permitted under Title VII);
Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970) appeal dismissed sub. nom., Coit v. Green,
400 U.S. 986 (1971); Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 240 F. Supp. 709 (D. La. 1965). affd.
370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.) (suit permitted under Title VI), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 911 (1967),
160. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388. 409 (1971) (Harlan. J.
concurring); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433-35 (1964); Mortimer v. Delta Air Lines.
302 F. Supp. 276, 279 (N.D. Il1. 1969).
161. See, e.g., CAL LABOR CODE §§ 1412, 1420, 1432.5 (West Supp, 1977). ILL, CONST.
art. I, § 19; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 §§ 65-22-65-31 (1977) (Pub. Act. 77-1211 §§ 2-11); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 4-33-7 (1974); Ohio A.S.S.B. No. 162, reprinted in 1976 Ohio Legislative Service.
162. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV and note 64 supra.
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without resort to the regulations. The unusual character of section
504, as a civil rights statute, guaranteeing "the equal opportunity in
education, . . . and the pursuit of happiness that was the dream of
our forefathers," enables it to fit within the exceptions to the restricted
implication doctrine which were recognized by Black in his Bivens
dissent. The language of the statute, its legislative history both before
and after enactment, its similarity to section 601 of the Civil Rights
Act, and the value of the effective enforcement of civil rights guaran-
teed over four years ago, enable section 504 to satisfy the stringent
Cori criteria for implication of a private cause of action.
VI. CONCLUSION
Early in the history of our judicial system in the case of Marbury
v. Madison, the Supreme Court proclaimed that "[tlhe very essence of
civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim
the protection of our laws, whenever he receives an injury." 63 This
generally recognized principle is embodied in the implication doc-
trine, the traditional method for vindication in the courts of rights
granted by statute but not otherwise enforced. Concerns of judicial
legislation and overburdened court dockets have led to the restriction
of the use of that doctrine. It is nevertheless of fundamental im-
portance that laws created by Congress to protect rights guaranteed
all persons by our Constitution be enforceable. When no remedy is
offered by government, or when the remedy offered is inadequate to
effectively vindicate those rights, the need for private judicial enforce-
ment overcomes institutional and pragmatic concerns.
Amtrak, SIPC, and Cort have reduced the utility of the implica-
tion doctrine in most regulatory areas, yet it still retains flexibility for
implying a right to sue to enforce a civil rights statute such as section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Lau demonstrates that the
Supreme Court will still allow private suit in situations in which it is
deemed valuable. Lloyd demonstrates that the implication doctrine,
even as narrowly defined by Cort, still may be used to permit a cause
of action under section 504.
Lloyd is a valuable decision. It encourages private individuals
to enforce rights created by Congress over four years ago. Yet the
narrow basis which supports the holding-the heavy reliance on ad-
ministrative regulations-threatens the holding's endurance as an ac-
cepted legal principle. A more proper application of the Cori test for
implication would derive the cause of action directly from the statute.
In the case of section 504, this method demonstrates that the civil
rights, antidiscrimination character of section 504 and its historical
163. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
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association with earlier civil rights provisions enable a private cause
of action to be implied squarely under the statute.
The narrow Lloyd reasoning is, moreover, inapplicable to other
conceivable statutes under which no administrative enforcement has
been undertaken. Persons injured by violations of other statutes
need not forfeit their statutory rights and courts faced with their
claims need not reject a valid claim because no clarifying regulations
exist from which to infer an implied cause of action. An application
of the Cort test as proposed will determine whether a private cause of
action can be inferred from the statutory section alone.
Catherine Adams
